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The Political Dimensions of Federal Preemption in the 
United States Courts of Appeals 
 
Bradley W. Joondeph∗ 
 
Introduction 
 
Judicial decisions resolving disputes over the federal preemption of state law raise 
some interesting questions about the role of politics in the federal courts.  First, many people 
do not consider preemption a particularly ideological issue, at least in comparison to many 
others addressed by the federal judiciary.1  Thus, it is not obvious that the voting patterns of 
federal judges appointed by Republican and Democratic presidents should differ measurably 
in this domain.2  Second, even if preemption questions do, in fact, strike some ideological 
chords, there are crosscurrents within the Republican and Democratic parties that render 
the directionality of that impact uncertain.  Conservatives might gravitate towards the 
preemption of state law—and liberals might shy away from it—because its immediate 
consequence is often to reduce the level of regulation imposed on private businesses (and to 
negate state-law remedies available to those alleging injuries caused by those businesses).  
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law, Santa Clara University.  I am grateful to David Ball, David Friedman, 
Kyle Graham, Deep Gulasekaram, Susie Morse, Michelle Oberman, Terri Peretti, David 
Sloss, Bill Sundstrom, Gerry Uelmen, and David Yosifon for their helpful comments at 
various stages of this project, as well as all the participants in faculty workshops at the 
University of California-Davis School of Law and Santa Clara University School of Law.  
This study would not have been possible without the long hours of outstanding research 
assistance provided by Brian Diaz, Meredith Edwards, Mahmoud Fadli, Leslie Huang, and, 
most especially, Jennifer McAllister and Lara Muller. 
1 For example, a widely publicized recent study of the influence of political ideology on 
federal court of appeals judges’ voting patterns examined 24 distinct categories of cases, 
ranging from abortion to gay and lesbian rights to challenges to environmental regulations. 
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 17–18 (2006).  The authors, however, did not examine cases involving 
federal preemption, at least as a distinct category.  See id.  
2 The Sunstein et al. study, for instance, found no statistically significant difference in the 
voting patterns of Republican and Democrat courts of appeals judges in five categories of 
cases that would seem more politically salient than federal preemption: criminal appeals, the 
Commerce Clause, the Takings Clause, challenges to punitive damage awards, and standing.  
See id. at 48–54. 
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At the same time, many conservatives might oppose preemption—and many liberals might 
favor it—for broader, structural reasons:  The federal preemption of state law tends to reduce 
the policy autonomy of state governments, centralize power in the national government, and 
impose a greater level of national uniformity (and perhaps rationality) in legal standards.  In 
short, the political valence of federal preemption is not readily apparent, at least on its face.3 
This paper seeks to explore these empirical uncertainties—to measure the nature 
and extent of the current political dimensions of preemption in the federal appellate courts.  
More concretely, it presents a statistical study of the published preemption decisions of the 
United States Courts of Appeals over the past five years.  I chose the circuit courts (rather 
than the Supreme Court of the United States) for two principal reasons.  First, the Courts of 
Appeals collectively decide thousands of cases each year, permitting the compilation of a 
much larger data set, which in turn facilitates more robust statistical conclusions.  Second, 
the cases that reach the Supreme Court are typically much more controversial and politically 
salient than the average case in the federal system as a whole.4  Thus, drawing inferences 
about judicial behavior more generally from the voting patterns of Supreme Court justices 
can be highly problematic. 
To conduct my study, then, I created a unique data set that includes every published 
preemption decision rendered by the United States Courts of Appeals from January 1, 2005, 
to December 31, 2009, a total of 420 decisions and almost 1,300 judicial votes.  And these 
data tell a story consisting of two distinct parts.  The first part is that preemption disputes 
seem to produce a large measure of judicial consensus.  In the full universe of cases, there is 
only a slight difference between Republican and Democratic appointees:  Republican judges 
voted for outcomes favoring the preemption of state law at a rate exceeding Democratic 
                                                 
3 Cf. Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial 
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 133–62 (2001) (discussing the historical reasons that federalism, as 
a constitutional principle, should have no particular political valence). 
4 See Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 261, 265 (2006). 
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judges by a margin of roughly 5 percent.5  This difference is not trivial, but it is not 
statistically significant at a 95 percent level of confidence.6  Moreover, this overall similarity 
was not the product of Republicans and Democrats disagreeing in different clusters of cases, 
such that their aggregate voting records masked fairly frequent clashes.  Rather, more than 
94 percent of the circuit courts’ published preemption decisions were unanimous, a rate that 
exceeds our best estimates of the mean for published Court of Appeals decisions as a whole.7  
Preemption therefore differs from many other legal issues (such as abortion, the death 
penalty, environmental regulation, gender discrimination, and disability discrimination, to 
name a few) where investigators have recently found significant partisan disparities in the 
voting records of federal circuit judges. 
The second part of the story is that, despite this general consensus, there remain 
some important differences between Republican and Democratic appointees.  A finer parsing 
of the data reveals that, when the judicial panel was ideologically homogenous (either all-
Republican or all-Democrat), Republicans were substantially more likely than Democrats to 
vote in favor of preemption (roughly 50 percent versus 35 percent).  Moreover, in the most 
contested preemption cases—those in which at least one Republican and one Democrat 
served on the panel, and at least one judge dissented—Republican appointees were more 
than three times as likely as Democratic appointees to vote in favor of preemption (roughly 
72 percent versus 22 percent).     
                                                 
5 For the sake of simplicity, I refer to judges appointed by Republican presidents as 
“Republican judges” or “Republicans,” and judges appointed by Democratic presidents as 
“Democratic judges” or “Democrats.”  Of course, some judges are cross-party appointments, 
though this has become increasingly uncommon for federal circuit court judgeships.   
6 To determine statistical significance, I used a two-tailed, difference of proportions z-test.  
The finding that the difference in voting records between Republicans and Democrats was 
not statistically significant (at a 95 percent level of confidence) means that there is a greater 
than 5 percent chance that we would obtain the observed difference between Republicans 
and Democrats even if the null hypothesis—that there is no difference between Republican 
and Democratic judges on the issue of preemption—is true. This does not mean, however, 
that there is a greater than 5 percent chance that the null hypothesis is true. 
7 Though there does not appear to be a hard figure, most observers believe the rate of 
unanimity in Court of Appeals cases in published decisions is roughly 90%.  See Brian Z. 
Tamanaha, Devising Rule of Law Baselines: The Next Step in Quantitative Studies of 
Judging, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1547981. 
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Thus, the full picture of preemption decisions in the Courts of Appeals is intriguing, 
if somewhat unsurprising.  In general, preemption cases do not provoke much ideological 
fissure among federal circuit judges.  The vast majority of cases are decided unanimously, 
such that a judge’s party affiliation lacks much value in predicting how she will vote in the 
randomly selected case.  But in particular circumstances—especially the small subset of 
preemption cases where judges disagree on the result—party affiliation appears to be highly 
predictive of how that disagreement will play out.  In these marginal cases—where the 
accepted sources of legal authority fail to control the outcome, and the norms of consensus 
and collegiality are insufficient to restrain judicial dissent—the pattern is unmistakable:  
Republicans are far more likely than Democrats to favor the federal preemption of state law. 
 
I.  Federal preemption 
 
The second clause of Article VI of the Constitution, better known as the Supremacy 
Clause, reads as follows: 
 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws 
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.8 
 
The Supreme Court has long understood this language as dictating that, when federal law 
and a state law conflict, the state law—whether in the form of a state constitutional 
provision, statute, administrative regulation, or common law rule of liability—is inoperable.9  
                                                 
8 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
9 See, e.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  See also Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (“since our decision in [M’Culloch], it has been 
settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is “without effect”) (quoting Maryland v. 
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)). 
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For instance, in the famous 1824 decision of Gibbons v. Ogden,10 the Court held that the 
Federal Navigation Act of 1793 preempted a New York state statute that had granted two 
businessmen a monopoly for the operation of all steamboats in New York waters.  As Chief 
Justice Marshall reasoned, in cases where “acts of the State Legislatures, . . . though enacted 
in the execution of acknowledged State powers, interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of 
Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution, or some treaty made under the authority of 
the United States,” the “act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, 
though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.” 11 
These basic understandings of the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of preemption 
still govern today, though modern Supreme Court decisions have tended to sort preemption 
cases into a handful of different categories.  One such category is express preemption, 
instances in which Congress has demarcated the breadth of a federal statute’s preemptive 
reach through an explicit statutory provision.12  In these cases, the question turns on 
whether the statute’s preemption clause covers the state statute, regulation, or common law 
rule of liability at issue.  More commonly, appellate litigation involves questions of implied 
preemption, instances in which Congress’s intent to displace state law might logically be 
inferred from the terms of the federal statute.  The Supreme Court has identified three 
general bases for drawing such an inference: (1) impossibility preemption, when it is 
physically impossible for the regulated party to comply simultaneously with state and federal 
law; (2) field preemption, when Congress has regulated a field so extensively that it has left 
no room for state-law supplementation; and (3) frustration of purpose (or obstacle) 
preemption, when the state law at issue frustrates the purposes of (or stands as an obstacle 
to the objectives of) the relevant federal regulatory scheme, taken as a whole. 
                                                 
10 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
11 Id. at 211. 
12 Section 1144(a) of the Earned Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is a typical.  It 
provides that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”  29 U.S.C. §1144(a).   
5 
 
The Political Dimensions of Federal Preemption (03.15.10 draft) 
 
While these categories may be helpful in distinguishing the various means by which 
Congress might indicate the scope of its preemptive intent, they ultimately have no 
independent legal significance.  As the Supreme Court has acknowledged on several 
occasions, the “ultimate touchstone” in every preemption case is Congress’s intent.  More 
precisely, the question is always whether Congress intended its regulatory scheme to 
displace the sort of state law in question, regardless of whether Congress indicated that 
intent in express or implied terms. 
Given the inherently statute-specific nature of any preemption controversy, 
particular preemption decisions tend to be narrow in their scope and limited in their 
significance.  As a result, unless the federal or state law at issue is particularly important, or 
happens to touch on a politically controversial topic, preemption cases generally lack much 
salience.  Of course, there are important exceptions.  Some recent preemption disputes have 
concerned the states’ leeway to regulate in the field of immigration and naturalization; to use 
their investment and procurement practices to express their moral objections to the human 
rights records of foreign regimes; to regulate automobile emissions in an effort to reduce 
greenhouse gases; and to regulate the labeling and marketing of tobacco products, especially 
to minors.   
But such cases are relatively few and far between.  More common are cases like 
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, where the Supreme Court decided that the Federal Boat 
Safety Act of 1971 (and the actions of the Coast Guard in administering the Act) did not 
preempt a state common-law tort action claiming that a particular power boat motor was 
unreasonably dangerous for lacking a propeller guard.  Or Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. 
Shanklin, in which the Court held that the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, in 
conjunction with a Federal Highway Administration regulation promulgated under the Act, 
preempted a state tort action for damages alleging that the railroad failed to maintain 
adequate warning devices at a particular grade crossing in rural Tennessee.  In other words, 
the garden variety preemption decision is rather mundane and case-specific.   
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The overall trajectory of preemption decisions is another matter.  As many scholars 
have noted, federal preemption as a general issue is quite important to the balance of federal 
and state power in our constitutional system.13  The fields regulated by the federal 
government have grown dramatically over the last century, such that federal law now 
reaches into almost every corner of national life.  From crime to environmental protection to 
corporate governance, federal law regulates private conduct that generally was subject only 
to state control for the Nation’s first 150 years.  Granted, some of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions have narrowed the breadth of Congress’s legislative powers.  But they have done so 
only at the outermost edges of that authority.  Congress can still regulate any activity that is 
economic or commercial in nature, as well as a good deal of activity that is not.14   
Thus, the vast majority of human activity in the United States is regulable by both 
the federal government and the states.  This means that the frequency with which courts 
conclude that federal law displaces state law on the same subject is quite important to the 
breadth and depth of the states’ residuary powers—and thus to the constitutional values that 
federalism is supposed to promote.  As Justice Breyer has observed, 
 
in today’s world, filled with legal complexity, the true test of federalist principle may 
lie, not in the occasional constitutional effort to trim Congress’ commerce power at 
the edges, or to protect a State’s treasury from a private damages action, but rather 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); Gillian Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism; Ernest 
Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, TEX. L. REV. 
14 As the Court clarified in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), noneconomic, 
noncommercial, purely intrastate activities are still subject to federal regulation if Congress 
rationally “concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut” a larger, 
comprehensive scheme that, taken as a whole, plainly regulates interstate commerce.  Id. at 
18.  Moreover, Congress can cure any constitutionally deficient statute by adding a 
“jurisdictional element”—language that ensures, on a case-by-case basis, that the regulated 
activity has a sufficient connection to interstate commerce.  See United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).  In fact, this is 
precisely what happened in the wake of the Court’s decision in Lopez.  A year later, Congress 
amended the Gun-Free School Zones Act to add eleven words to 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(2)(A), 
defining the relevant offense as the knowing possession of “a firearm that has moved in or 
that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or 
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”  Pub. L. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009, §657 
(Sept. 30, 1996), codified at 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(2)(A) (emphasis added).     
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in those many statutory cases where courts interpret the mass of technical detail 
that is the ordinary diet of the law.15 
 
While the values of federalism lurk in every preemption case—at least at the level of 
structural principle—the more immediate, substantive consequences often involve the level 
or stringency of governmental regulation imposed on private businesses.  To be sure, 
preemption cases encompass a wide variety of topics, many of which have nothing to do with 
economic regulation.  But the prototypical preemption dispute presents the judge with a 
choice between holding (a) that a given aspect of a business’s activities is regulated 
exclusively by federal law, or (b) that the activity is regulated by both federal and state law.  
In other words, the question is how much regulation will govern a particular manifestation of 
private enterprise.  Can a state impose common-law tort liability on a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer for the marketing of a drug whose label has been approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration, or is the FDA’s regulation of the drug’s marketing exclusive?  Can a 
state hold a tobacco manufacturer liable for fraudulent misrepresentation in connection with 
the manufacturer’s sale of “light cigarettes,” or is the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act the only 
regulation with which it must comply?  In immediate, substantive terms, preemption cases 
typically require judges to choose between differing levels of government regulation. 
It is these substantive, practical consequences that render the political valence of 
federal preemption uncertain.  On the one hand, political conservatives (and thus members 
of the Republican Party), as a matter of constitutional structure, seem to prefer a smaller 
federal government and greater policy autonomy for the states.16  By contrast, Democrats 
have often opposed these ideas, at least as a matter of judicial enforcement, and have been 
more comfortable affording Congress a wide berth in the exercise of its legislative powers.  
Thus, it is conceivable that Democrats would be more likely than Republicans to favor the 
                                                 
15 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160–161 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
16 This has been reflected in Republican Party Platforms over the past 30 years.  See Bradley 
W. Joondeph, Federalism, the Rehnquist Court, and the Modern Republican Party, 87 ORE. L. 
REV. 117, 158–60 (2008). 
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federal preemption of state law.  Indeed, along the dimension of state autonomy, this would 
match the behavior of Supreme Court in its recent spate of federalism decisions concerning 
the limits on Congress’s enumerated powers—cases involving the Commerce Clause, the 
Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Here, the Court’s more conservative justices have consistently favored outcomes promoting 
state sovereignty or state policy autonomy, while the more liberal justices have embraced a 
broader vision of national power.17 
On the other hand, decisions favoring federal preemption tend to reduce the level and 
stringency of government regulation imposed on private businesses.  And a centerpiece of 
modern Republican philosophy has been a faith in free markets—a conviction that private 
ordering tends to better serve social welfare than government regulation.18  Preemption 
usually limits or eliminates the capacity of state or local governments to regulate particular 
business activities more rigorously than the federal government, and it often eliminates a 
means of redress under state tort law for persons alleging injury from those activities.  It is 
no secret that the Democratic Party has generally favored the preservation such state-level 
regulation, particularly in the form of tort actions initiated by plaintiffs’ attorneys.  Thus, it 
is likewise conceivable that Republican judges would vote in favor of preemption more 
frequently than Democratic judges.  
Hence, the political dimensions of preemption controversies in the federal courts are 
not facially obvious.  Ideological currents pull in both directions.  And this uncertainty raises 
some interesting empirical questions.  In fine, is there a meaningful difference in the voting 
records of Republican and Democratic appellate judges in cases asking whether federal law 
preempts state law?  And if so, what is the nature and size of that difference?    
 
                                                 
17 See id. at 138–47. 
18 See id. 
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 II.  Federal Preemption in the United States Court of Appeals  
 
A. Politics, judicial decision making, and the Courts of Appeals 
 
At least in the field of political science, scholars have long recognized a measurable 
association between appellate judges’ political affiliations and their decision making.19  The 
basic reason is that the resolution of many legal questions requires the exercise of discretion.  
The authoritative sources of law—the relevant text, history, tradition, precedent, and the 
like—are often too indeterminate to dictate objectively correct answers.  This indeterminacy 
leaves judges with considerable freedom to wander, unencumbered by authoritative 
instructions.  And in exercising this discretion, judges—like all human beings—cannot help 
but resort to their own predispositions, their deeply ingrained beliefs and values, if only 
subconsciously.  In the process, a judge’s own policy preferences invariably influence her 
behavior, even when she sincerely believes she is merely acting as “a servant of the law.”   
To be sure, it remains an open question as to exactly how much of the variance in 
judicial behavior is explained by a judge’s personal ideology—that is, we are still trying to 
pin down what proportion of judicial decision making is “law,” what proportion is “politics,” 
and what proportion is attributable to other factors.  Moreover, investigators are not always 
precise in how they define “politics” in this context.20  The influence of “politics” on judging 
might refer to the personal, political ideology of the judge; or the policy priorities of the 
political coalition that placed the judge in office; or external, political pressures brought to 
bear on a judge after she has assumed office; or a variety of other mechanisms by which the 
American political system, writ large, shapes the agenda and decision making of the 
judiciary.21  But these complications do not obscure a very basic truth:  The empirical 
evidence of a connection between judges’ political affiliation and their voting records on the 
                                                 
19 See TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 101–131 (1999). 
20 See Bradley W. Joondeph, The Many Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Decision Making, 
U.M.K.C. L. REV. (2009). 
21 See id. 
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bench is simply overwhelming.  Republican judges vote more frequently for politically 
conservative legal outcomes than Democratic judges.  As a prominent political scientist 
recently wrote, “[n]o serious scholar of the judiciary denies that the decisions of judges, 
especially at the Supreme Court level, are at least partially influenced by the judges’ 
ideology.”22 
Much of the research documenting this association has focused on the Supreme 
Court, precisely the place we would expect to see it most readily.  Because the Court’s merits 
docket is almost completely discretionary, the justices generally grant review only of those 
cases presenting questions on which lower courts have disagreed.  As a result, the issues 
invariably are quite difficult, with plausible arguments on both sides.  And this means that 
the justices enjoy a great deal of discretion—much more discretion in deciding legal 
questions than any other judges in the American legal system.  The Court’s power to control 
its merits docket also means that it generally decides cases that are, comparatively speaking, 
controversial and politically salient.  Thus, the subject matter of the issues that the Court 
takes on makes it more likely that the justices’ ideological leanings will come to the fore and 
influence their decision making. 
By contrast, United States Court of Appeals judges are more hemmed in by 
controlling legal authority, and their typical decision lacks much (if any) political salience.  
Federal circuit courts are required to review every appeal taken from a final judgment issued 
by a United States District Court, and they face a thicker web of binding legal precedent, 
consisting not just Supreme Court decisions (which are more binding on the Courts of 
Appeals than on the Court itself) but also the circuit court’s own decisions and, to a large 
degree, the decisions of its sister circuits.  In the full run of cases, these institutional 
                                                 
22 Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Deference to Congress: An Examination of the Marksist 
Model, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 237 
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).  See also Frank Cross, Decision Making 
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1482 (2003) (“The weight of 
empirical evidence clearly reveals some role for ideology in judicial decisionmaking.”). 
11 
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constraints make the behavior of circuit court judges, again comparatively speaking, less 
susceptible to the influence of their ideological preferences.   
But this is not to say that Court of Appeals judges lack discretion in their decision 
making, or that their decisions are unaffected by their political commitments.  Scores of 
studies have established a significant correlation between the political affiliations of circuit 
court judges and their voting behavior.  Consider the following:   
 
* Thirty-five years ago, Sheldon Goldman established that the party of the 
appointing president explained a substantial portion of the variance in circuit judges’ 
voting records in several issue areas, including criminal procedure, civil liberties, and 
labor.23   
 
* In an important 1998 study, Tracey George found, among other things, that “the 
majority of circuit judges participating in en banc cases vote their sincere policy 
preferences, or ideology, without constraint from their colleagues or the Supreme 
Court.”24   
 
* A widely discussed 2006 book by Cass Sunstein and three co-authors, published in 
2006, found statistically significant differences in the voting records of Republican 
and Democratic circuit judges in eighteen discrete categories of cases, ranging from 
state immunity from damages actions under the Eleventh Amendment to actions by 
the Environmental Protection Agency to restrictions on campaign financing.25   
 
* Frank Cross’s 2007 book, Decision Making in the U.S. Court of Appeals, presented a 
thorough examination of several potential influences on circuit court decisions and 
                                                 
23 Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 501 (1975). 
24 Tracey George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1684 (1998). 
25 SUNSTEIN ET AL, supra note ___, at 17–57.  The full list of issue areas in which the 
investigators found statistically significant differences between republicans and Democrats 
is as follows: gay and lesbian rights, affirmative action, those implicating the National 
Environmental Policy Act, capital punishment, state immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment, those challenging the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, sex 
discrimination, disability discrimination, abortion, campaign finance, piercing the corporate 
veil, those involving the Environmental Protection Agency, obscenity, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, racial desegregation, those challenging actions by the Federal Communications 
Commission, Contracts Clause, and commercial speech cases under the First Amendment. 
12 
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concluded that, using a variety of approaches to test the question, “[t]he results are 
fairly consistent in showing some effect of ideology that is typically a statistically 
significant association.”26   
 
This list only scratches the surface.  Scores of other studies have established similar patterns 
across a wide variety of issues.27   
To my knowledge, though, no scholar has yet examined whether this association 
extends to cases involving the federal preemption of state law—and if so, in which direction 
the connection runs.  The omission is unfortunate, given the significance of preemption cases 
as a proportion of the Courts of Appeals dockets, as well as the importance of these decisions 
(at least in aggregate) to the federal-state balance in our constitutional system.  This study 
marks a step towards filling that gap. 
 
B. Study design 
 
The central purpose of the study was to assess whether there is a significant 
difference in the voting records of Republican and Democratic appointees to the United 
States Courts of Appeals in preemption cases.28  To pursue this objective, I (with the help of 
                                                 
26 FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 38 (2007). 
27 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship abd Obedience to 
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE. L.J. 2155 (1998); 
Donald R. Songer & Martha Humphries Ginn, Assessing the Impact of Presidential and 
Home State Influences on Judicial Decisionmaking in the United States Courts of Appeals, 55 
POL. RES. Q. 299 (2002); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the 
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology 
in American Courts: A Meta-analyis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219 (1999); Robert A. Carp et al., The 
Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by President Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298 (1993); Jon 
Gottschall, Reagan’s Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a 
Judicial Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48 (1986). 
28 For purposes of the study, I defined a “preemption case” as any decision on the merits in 
which the circuit court resolved whether a federal statute, or a regulation promulgated by a 
federal agency pursuant to such a statute, precluded the application of a state statute, state 
regulation, state common law rule of liability, or state constitutional provision.  This is not 
the only possible conception of federal preemption; it might also include, ofr instance, 
instances in which states are forbidden from regulating in a certain field (for instance, 
foreign affairs) because the subject matter is constitutionally allocated to the national 
government.  My definition, though, captures the typical preemption case, and thus includes 
13 
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several research assistants) created a unique data set consisting of every published 
preemption decision rendered by one of the thirteen federal circuit courts29 from January 1, 
2005, to December 31, 2009.30  Each decision was coded for, inter alia, five dependent 
variables: (1) the court deciding the case, (2) the participating judges, (3) the president who 
appointed each of the judges, (4) whether the decision was unanimous, and (5) the partisan 
composition of the panel.  The independent variable was whether the direction of each 
judge’s vote: whether it supported or rejected the outcome resulting in the federal 
preemption of state law.31  
The data set is unique in two respects.  First, it has culled the decisions based on 
whether the preemption of state law by a federal statute or regulation was at issue.  Other 
United States Court of Appeals databases, though offering a wealth of useful ways to study 
the circuit courts, have not coded decisions for this characteristic.  Second, this data set is 
comprehensive over the period of inquiry.  It includes all 420 published preemption decision 
handed down by a federal circuit court in the years 2005 through 2009. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the overwhelming majority of decisions that one might describe as involving federal 
preemption. 
29 The cases included in the study were identified in the following manner:  
• First, I conducted searches in Westlaw’s United States Courts of Appeals database 
(CTA) or the court-specific databases (e.g., CTA1 for the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit) searching for forms of the word “preempt” or 
preemption” in the headnotes of the opinion.  Thus, I ran the query “he(preempt! pre-
empt)” with the relevant date restriction. 
• Second, I or one of my research assistants examined the content of each opinion 
generated by the query to determine whether the court’s holding—its ultimate legal 
judgment in the case—concerned the federal preemption of state law, as defined 
above.  In many instances it did not, as the opinion simply referred to preemption 
without actually deciding a preemption issue.  Such cases were excluded from the 
data set.   
• Third, I or one of my research assistants coded the opinions for the relevant 
independent variables and the dependant variable, entering this information into 
Excel spreadsheets. 
• Finally, I reexamined the data and the text of several opinions for coding errors, 
making corrections and adjustments as warranted.    
30 I selected the time frame of the study largely for purposes of convenience.  The object of the 
study was to evaluate how federal judges are voting currently, so I wanted the cases to be as 
recent as possible.  Five years of decisions was roughly what I and my research assistants 
had the capacity to review and code in the time available.   
31 The data set (and the accompanying code book) is freely available for download as an Excel 
spreadsheet at the following web site: CITE. 
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Because the question I sought to answer was whether two independent proportions 
were meaningfully different—one proportion being the percentage of votes by Republican 
appointees favoring preemption, the other being the percentage of similar votes by 
Democratic appointees—I employed a two-tailed, two-sample z-test to measure the statistical 
significance of the observed differences.  The null hypothesis was that Republicans and 
Democrats do not differ from one another in their preferences for the federal preemption of 
state law.  I used a 95 percent level of confidence as a threshold for significance; thus, a 
finding of statistical significance means that if the null hypothesis is true, there is less than 
a 5 percent chance that we would see the observed difference. 
Several cases included in the data set raised multiple preemption issues within the 
same decision.  New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n v. Rowe32 is a good example.  There, a 
trade association representing air and motor carriers sued the Attorney General of Maine 
seeking a declaration that the Maine Tobacco Delivery Law, which required persons 
delivering tobacco products directly to consumers to take certain steps intended to ensure 
that the products were not being purchased by minors, was preempted by the Federal 
Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994.  The Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit held that (1) those requirements in Maine’s law concerning the method by which 
carriers must deliver packages that might affect the timeliness of deliveries were preempted, 
but that (2) the Maine law’s ban on the knowing delivery of tobacco products to minors was 
not.  In such instances, I coded a judge who favored preemption on some but not all of the 
issues as lodging half of a vote for each result.  No doubt, there are other defensible ways of 
coding such votes.33  But this approach is consistent with the methodology of other empirical 
studies of judicial behavior in preemption cases, and it avoids overemphasizing particular 
preemption decisions that happen to raise multiple issues. 
                                                 
32 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006), overruled in part, 552 U.S. 364 (2004). 
33 For instance, one could treat each individual preemption issue (or claim) as a separate 
decision, and thus a distinct vote. 
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A final point about methodology:  Because the study attempts to draw conclusions 
about the judges’ behavior by tallying their votes favoring one outcome or another, it suffers 
from the shortcomings inherent in any vote-counting, outcome-focused approach.34  First, it 
ignores what the judges actually wrote in their opinions.  And the content of the opinions can 
be just as important—sometimes much more important—than whether the judgment under 
review was affirmed, reversed, or vacated.35  Second, it places equal weight on each decision, 
even though some cases are clearly more significant than others.  But these weaknesses 
should not be overstated.  Outcomes may be a crude measure of the judiciary’s decisional 
output,36 but they can still tell us a great deal about patterns of judicial behavior.  Moreover, 
focusing on outcomes allows us to record the judges’ positions quite objectively, reducing the 
potential for bias in our data collection.  Thus, while outcome-based studies cannot answer 
all of the interesting questions,37 they can still shed significant light on judicial decision 
making.38 
 
C. Results 
 
From January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2009, the United States Courts of Appeals 
issued 420 published decisions addressing a dispute as to whether federal law preempted 
state law, 417 of which were decided by three-judge panels and three of which were decided 
en banc.  In this full universe of decisions, the difference in the voting records of Republican 
and Democratic appointees was relatively small.  Judges appointed by Republican presidents 
                                                 
34 On the weaknesses inherent in such studies, see Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith & 
Antonio Tomarchio, The Reagan Revolution in the Network of Law, at 7–8 (2006) (working 
paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=909217); Friedman, 
supra note ___, at 265–266. 
35 See Friedman, supra note ___, at 265–266 (discussing the importance of the content of 
Supreme Court’s opinions in evaluating the significance of the Court’s work).   
36 See Cross, Smith & Tomarchio, supra note __, at 7.  
37 See Friedman, supra note __, at 265–266. 
38 See Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal 
Model” of Judicial Decisionmaking, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 494–495 (2001) (describing 
the importance of such studies, even if they should be supplemented with historical and 
interpretivist inquiries).  
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voted in favor of preemption more frequently than judges appointed by Democratic 
presidents, but only by a margin of roughly 5 percent (53.70% versus 48.71%).  This 
difference is not statistically significant at the P=.05 level of confidence.39 
 
Table 1 
 
Voting records of United States Court of Appeals judges  
in published preemption decisions, 2005–2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Republican appointees 
 
Democratic appointees 
 
Proportion of votes in favor of 
outcome resulting in federal 
preemption of state law 
 
 
 
53.70% 
N=420.5 
 
 
48.71% 
N=246 
 
Proportion of votes against 
outcome resulting in federal 
preemption of state law 
 
 
 
 
46.30% 
N=362.5 
 
 
51.29% 
N=259 
    
 
 Importantly, this partisan similarity in overall voting records was not the product of 
Republican and Democratic appointees voting differently in different groups of decisions—
those where, alternatively, Republicans and Democrats favored preemption 
disproportionately, such that their divergent voting patterns canceled each other out in 
aggregate.  Rather, preemption appears to be an area of above-average consensus on the 
Courts of Appeals, and perhaps substantially so.  Of the 420 cases included in the data set, 
396 (almost 95 percent) involved no dissent, at least on the question of federal preemption.  
(This proportion would assuredly be higher if we also considered the preemption cases that 
were resolved though unpublished dispositions.)  Indeed, more than 93 percent of the cases 
                                                 
39 The Z value for these two proportions is 1.672, yielding a confidence level of 90.5 percent.  
This means that, if the null hypothesis (that Republicans and Democrats are identical in how 
they vote in preemption cases) is true, there is a 9.5 percent chance that we would seen the 
observed difference.  
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decided by ideologically mixed panels—panels with at least one Republican appointee and 
one Democratic appointee—were resolved unanimously.  (Again, the proportion would be 
even larger if we also considered unpublished opinions.)     
 
Table 2 
 
Rates of unanimity in different categories of published preemption decisions handed down by 
the United States Courts of Appeals, 2005–2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proportion of cases decided unanimously 
 
 
All published opinions 
 
 
 
 
94.29% 
N=420 
 
 
 
Ideologically mixed panels 
 
 
 
 
93.15% 
N=292 
 
 
 
Ideologically homogenous panels 
 
 
 
 
96.85% 
N=127 
 
 
 
 Though dissensus in preemption decisions was relatively rare, it occurred 
disproportionately in cases resolved by ideologically mixed panels.  That is, while most mixed 
panels were unanimous, they were also the place where disagreement was most likely to 
arise.  (Given the small number of non-unanimous decisions, however, the difference between 
the proportion of non-unanimous opinions decided by mixed ideological panels and the 
proportion of all decisions decided by mixed ideological panels was not statistically 
significant.) 
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Table 3 
 
Proportions of United States Court of Appeals published preemption decisions decided by 
ideologically homogenous and ideologically mixed panels, 2005–2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proportion of all  
decisions 
N=420 
 
 
Proportion of non-unanimous 
decisions 
N=24 
 
 
Ideologically mixed panels 
N=293 
 
 
 
 
69.76% 
 
 
 
83.33% 
 
 
Ideologically homogenous panels 
N=127 
 
 
 
 
30.24% 
 
 
16.67% 
 
 
Indeed, when we focus on this small proportion of published preemption decisions, 
where at least one judge registered a dissent, the divide between Republicans and Democrats 
was rather striking.  It was even more pronounced (though just slightly so) in those non-
unanimous decisions where at least one Republican and one Democrat served on the panel—
cases in which Republicans and Democrats were exposed to precisely the same case stimuli.  
(And it hardly seems coincidental that all twenty cases in which a Republican voted 
differently than a Democrat involved the validity of a state law, regulation, or common-law 
rule imposing additional obligations on a private business.)  These differences between these 
proportions are statistically significant at a confidence level of 99 percent.40 
 
                                                 
40 The Z value for the difference of the proportions in all non-unanimous cases is 3.908.  The 
Z value for the difference of the proportions in non-unanimous cases in which at least one 
republican and one Democrat participated is 4.025.  With respect to both, if the null 
hypothesis is true (no difference between Republicans and Democrats), there is a less than 1 
percent chance that we would see the observed difference. 
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Table 4 
 
Percentage of votes by United States Court of Appeals judges in favor of preemption  
 in non-unanimous published decisions, 2005–2009 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Republican appointees 
 
Democratic appointees 
 
 
All non-unanimous decisions 
N=24 
 
 
 
 
68.75% 
N=40 
 
 
23.86% 
N=44 
 
Non-unanimous decisions 
with ideologically mixed 
panels 
N=20 
 
 
 
72.06% 
N=34 
 
 
22.37% 
N=38 
 
 
If we widen our lens back out to the full universe of preemption decisions, we see 
little difference among the judges’ voting records based on the identity of the appointing 
president—a finding that is unsurprising given the general lack of partisan disparities.  In 
the full run of cases, judges appointed by President Clinton were indistinguishable from 
judges appointed by President George W. Bush, President George H.W. Bush, or President 
Reagan.  Interestingly, though, judges appointed by President Carter differed from all the 
others, voting in favor of preemption roughly 10 percent less frequently than those appointed 
by the other presidents.  This difference was statistically significant at the P=.05 level in 
comparison to Clinton appointees and George W. Bush appointees, and it was statistically 
significant at the P=.10 level in comparison to George H.W. Bush appointees and Reagan 
appointees.  Also noteworthy is that, although Clinton appointees were no different than 
Republicans overall, they were quite different in non-unanimous cases, casting only 22 
percent of such votes in favor of preemption.  The same was true of George W. Bush 
appointees, but in the opposite direction; they voted for preemption at a rate of 87.5 percent 
in non-unanimous cases.  The sample sizes for these last two groups—Clinton and George W. 
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Bush appointees in non-unanimous cases—are very small, so we cannot infer much from 
them.  However scant, though, these data are consistent with what we see elsewhere: a very 
significant partisan split at the margin, despite strong similarity on the issue area as a 
whole. 
 
Table 5 
Percentage of votes by United States Court of Appeals judges in favor of preemption in 
published decisions, organized by appointing president (minimum of 100 votes), 2005–2009 
 
  
All decisions 
 
 
Non-unanimous decisions 
 
Judges appointed by 
President Carter  
 
 
44.76% 
N=124 
 
 
50.00% 
N=9 
 
Judges appointed by 
President Reagan  
 
 
53.65% 
N=274 
 
64.29% 
N=14 
 
Judges appointed by 
President G.H.W. Bush 
 
 
53.87% 
N=168 
 
66.67% 
N=12 
 
Judges appointed by 
President Clinton 
 
 
57.73% 
N=343 
 
 
21.21% 
N=33 
 
Judges appointed by 
President G.W. Bush 
 
 
55.71% 
N=280 
 
 
87.5% 
N=12 
 
Comparing the voting records of Republicans and Democrats across various panel 
compositions also illustrates a large degree of partisan consensus in the full universe of 
preemption decisions, but with an important caveat.  As reflected in the figures on unanimity 
infra, Republicans and Democrats voted quite similarly when they served on ideologically 
heterogeneous panels—panels with at least one Republican and one Democrat.  But a 
comparison of the voting records on ideologically homogenous panels—three-judge panels 
comprised exclusively of Republicans or Democrats—reveals some partisan cleavage.  Here, 
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the difference in voting records between Republicans (50 percent in favor of preemption) and 
Democrats (36 percent in favor of preemption) is considerably larger—indeed, statistically 
significant at the P=.05 level.41  What is more, this difference is almost entirely attributable 
to a shift in behavior by Democrats.  While Democrats voted in favor of preemption at a rate 
of roughly 54 cases when serving on panels with at least one Republican, that rate dropped 
to 35 percent when the panel consisted entirely of Democratic appointees. 
 
                                                 
41  The Z value for the difference of these proportions is 2.24.  Thus, the likelihood of 
obtaining this large of a difference if the null hypothesis is true is less than 5 percent. 
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Table 6 
 
Percentage of votes by United States Court of Appeals judges in favor of preemption in 
published decisions, organized by panel composition, 2005–2009 
 
 
 
Partisan composition of panel 
 
 
 
 
Republican appointees 
 
 
 
Democratic appointees 
 
 
3 Republicans 
N=101 
 
 
 
 
49.50% 
N=303 
 
 
——— 
 
 
2 Republicans and 1 Democrat 
N=174 
 
 
 
 
58.05% 
N=348 
 
 
55.17% 
N=174 
 
 
 
1 Republican and 2 Democrats 
N=116 
 
 
 
 
56.96% 
N=116 
 
 
53.26 
N=234 
 
 
3 Democrats 
N=26 
 
 
 
 
——— 
 
 
35.26 
N=78 
 
 
 
En banc 
N=3 
 
 
 
 
18.75% 
N=16 
 
 
0.00% 
N=23 
 
     
 Finally, sorting the data by the court of decision reveals some interesting disparities, 
though the small sample sizes should make us cautious in drawing any conclusions.  In a 
majority of the circuits (7 of 13), Democrats actually voted in favor of preemption more 
frequently than Republicans, and in at least one court (the First Circuit) by a wide margin.  
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the discrete group of judges most likely to vote against preemption 
was the Democratic appointees on the Ninth Circuit.  Interestingly, though, Democrats on 
some courts (such as the Eighth Circuit) were more likely to vote in favor of preemption than 
Republicans on most other courts.  And Republicans on some courts (such as the Ninth 
Circuit) were more likely to vote against preemption than Democrats on most other courts.   
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Table 7 
Proportion of votes in favor of preemption by court of decision 
 
  
Total 
 
 
Republicans 
 
Democrats 
 
First Circuit 
N=27 
 
 
46.30% 
N=81 
 
39.83% 
N=59 
 
63.64% 
N=22 
 
Second Circuit 
N=36 
 
 
57.87% 
N=108 
 
65.25% 
N=59 
 
48.98% 
N=49 
 
Third Circuit 
N=24 
 
 
48.59% 
N=71 
 
57.69% 
N=39 
 
37.50% 
N=32 
 
Fourth Circuit 
N=19 
 
 
52.63% 
N=57 
 
57.14% 
N=42 
 
40.00% 
N=15 
 
Fifth Circuit 
N=45 
 
 
39.63% 
N=135 
 
36.11% 
(N=90) 
 
45.00% 
N=45 
 
Sixth Circuit 
N=38 
 
 
44.71% 
N=123 
 
42.31% 
N=65 
 
47.41% 
N=58 
 
Seventh Circuit 
N=38 
 
 
61.84% 
N=134 
 
65.85% 
N=82 
 
51.56% 
N=32 
 
Eighth Circuit 
N=48 
 
 
69.79% 
N=144 
 
69.37% 
N=111 
 
71.21% 
N=33 
 
Ninth Circuit 
N=69 
 
 
35.46% 
N=227 
 
40.43% 
N=94 
 
31.95% 
N=133 
 
Tenth Circuit 
N=22 
 
 
51.52% 
N=66 
 
44.79% 
N=48 
 
69.44 
N=18 
 
Eleventh Circuit 
N=17 
 
 
54.90% 
N=51 
 
54.69% 
N=32 
 
55.26% 
N=19 
 
D.C. Circuit 
N=7 
 
 
80.95% 
N=21 
 
83.33% 
N=18 
 
66.67% 
N=3 
 
Federal Circuit 
N=8 
 
 
75.00% 
N=24 
 
66.67% 
N=12 
 
83.33% 
N=12 
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III.  Discussion 
 
Overall, these data reveal some interesting patterns, but two core themes stand 
above the others.  The first is one of bipartisan consensus.  In the vast majority of published 
preemption decisions, United States Court of Appeals judges were unanimous.  Indeed, the 
rate of unanimity in preemption cases (over 94 percent) exceeds our best estimates for the 
rate at which the circuit courts decide published decisions unanimously in general (90 to 93 
percent), and perhaps by a significant margin.  While Republicans voted in favor of 
preemption at a rate exceeding that for Democrats, the margin was relatively small (around 
5 percent).  Thus, preemption is unlike a number of other legal issues handled by the Courts 
of Appeals, carrying greater political salience, for which recent studies have found significant 
partisan voting differences.42   
The second theme concerns what happened at the margin—cases in which the lack of 
controlling legal authority, and perhaps the underlying subject matter of the dispute, led to 
judicial disagreement.  Though the proportion of preemption cases fitting this description 
was small, these decisions reveal a sizable partisan divide:  Republicans were far more likely 
than Democrats to vote in favor of preemption.  Thus, while consensus generally carried the 
day, when it did not, the disagreement almost always entailed Republican judges voting in 
favor of preemption and Democratic judges voting against it.   
Aside from these basic conclusions, three other findings warrant brief discussion as 
well: (1) the consistency of these results with the recent behavior of the Supreme Court; (2) 
the apparent ideological “panel effect” in voting patterns, at least among Democrats; and (3) 
                                                 
42 For instance, the Sunstein et al. study found statistically significant differences in the 
voting patterns of Republican and Democratic judges on the Court of Appeals in 23 different 
issue areas: affirmative action, the National Environmental Policy Act, capital punishment, 
the abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity, decisions by the National Labor Relations 
Board, sex discrimination, the Americans with Disabilities Act, abortion, campaign finance, 
piercing the corporate veil, cases involving the Environmental Protection Agency, obscenity, 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, racial segregation, cases involving the Federal 
Communications Commission, the Contracts Clause, and First Amendment challenges to 
commercial speech.  See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra, at 21–40, 54–57. 
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the differences in voting patterns across the federal circuit courts.  The following section 
briefly takes up these topics in turn.   
 
A.  Comparison to the Supreme Court  
 
One point worth noting is that the story of preemption in the Courts of Appeals, at 
least in its broad outlines, is quite similar to that at the Supreme Court over its past 
eighteen terms.  From October Term 1991 (when Justice Thomas joined the Court) through 
October Term 2008 (ending in June 2009), the Supreme Court decided 64 preemption cases 
on the merits following full briefing and oral argument.  The justices were unanimous in 31 
of these decisions (48.4 percent), a rate well above that for its merits docket as a whole 
(somewhere between 32 and 42 percent, depending on how one classifies decisions in which a 
justice concurs only in the judgment).43  Of course, a 48 percent unanimity rate falls well 
below that for preemption decisions in the Courts of Appeals, owing to the nature of Supreme 
Court’s merits docket; again, the Court typically hears only the most difficult cases, ones 
raising questions on which the lower courts have disagreed.  But the spread between the 
Court’s rate of unanimity in preemption cases and that for its merits docket as whole 
suggests that preemption has provoked a below-average level of ideological division among 
the justices.  
                                                 
43 If we count all decisions in which the Court was unanimous as to the result from October 
Term 1991 through October Term 2008, then the Court’s reate of unanimity in all cases 
decided with signed opinions after oral argument was 41.93% (639 out of 1,524).  If instead 
we only count those decisions in which the Court was unanimous both as to the result and 
the opinion, then the justices were unanimous in 32.68% of its cases decided with signed 
opinions after oral argument over this time frame.  See The Statistics, 123 HARV. L. REV. 382, 
387 (2009); The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 521 (2008); The Statistics, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 436, 441 (2007); The Statistics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 372, 377 (2006); The Statistics, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 415, 423 (2005); The Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497, 502 (2004); The 
Statistics, 117 HARV. L. REV. 480, 484 (2003); The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 457 
(2002); The Statistics, 115 HARV. L. REV. 539, 543 (2001); The Statistics, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
390, 394 (2000); The Statistics, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400, 404 (1999); The Statistics, 112 HARV. 
L. REV. 366, 370 (1998); The Statistics, 111 HARV. L. REV. 431, 433 (1997); The Statistics, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 367, 369 (1996); The Statistics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 340, 342 (1995); The 
Statistics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 372, 374 (1994); The Statistics, 107 HARV. L. REV. 372, 374 
(1993); The Statistics, 106 HARV. L. REV. 378, 380 (1992). 
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At the same time, in those preemption cases in which at least one justice dissented, 
Republican appointees favored preemption more frequently than Democratic appointees, and 
by a significant margin.  Justices appointed by Republican presidents (Chief Justices 
Rehnquist and Roberts and Associate Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Alito) voted in favor of preemption at a rate of 51.0 percent in 
non-unanimous cases, while justices appointed by Democratic presidents (Associate Justices 
White, Breyer, and Ginsburg) did so at a rate of only 32.5 percent.  Moreover, if we categorize 
the justices based on their widely acknowledged ideological leanings—that is, if we describe 
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter as liberals, despite their party affiliations at the 
time of their appointments—the fissure becomes substantial.  The Court’s more conservative 
justices voted in favor of preemption in non-unanimous cases at a rate of 59.0 percent, while 
the more liberal justices voted for preemption at a rate of only 32.9 percent.  Both of these 
differences—that between Republican and Democratic appointees, and that between more 
conservative and more liberal justices—are statistically significant at a 99 percent level of 
confidence.44 
Thus, preemption cases at the Supreme Court have played out in much the same way 
as they have in the Courts of Appeals.  In general, preemption has been a source of less 
ideological friction than the average issue on the Court’s docket.  But when the justices have 
disagreed, Republicans (and conservatives) have favored preemption much more frequently 
than Democrats (and liberals). 
 
B.  Ideological panel effects 
 
Another pattern worth noting concerns the behavior of Democratic appointees in 
cases decided by ideologically homogenous panels.  As Table 6 illustrates, Democratic judges 
voted in favor of preemption much less frequently when serving on panels comprised 
                                                 
44 The Z value for the difference between Republican and Democratic appointees is 2.598.  
The Z value for the difference between conservative and liberal justices is 4.5. 
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exclusively of fellow Democrats.  Specifically, Democratic judges voted in favor of preemption 
at a rate of 54 percent when serving on panels with at least one Republican appointee.  But 
that rate fell to only 35 percent when Democrats served on panels comprised only of 
Democrats.  By contrast, Republican voting patterns were fairly consistent across varying 
panel compositions.  (Indeed, Republican judges were least likely to vote in favor preemption 
when serving on all-Republican panels, though the difference between this rate and those for 
Republicans serving on ideologically mixed panels is not statistically significant.)   
Given that the number of decisions falling into each category is relatively small, and 
that the results concerning Republican judges serving on all-Republican panels is rather odd, 
we should be cautious in drawing any definite conclusions.  Still, the data suggest the 
existence of an ideological “panel effect” in preemption cases, albeit only for Democrats:  The 
absence of a potential dissenting voice in the conversation appears to have led Democratic 
judges (but not Republicans) to indulge their ideological preferences more freely and 
frequently.   
Such behavior would be consistent with the findings of other studies of judicial voting 
patterns on the Courts of Appeals.  The study by Sunstein and his co-authors discussed 
above, for instance, found statistically significant panel effects in the voting records of circuit 
court judges in sixteen of the twenty-four issue areas they examined.45  And separate studies 
of D.C. Circuit opinions in administrative law cases by Richard Revesz and by Frank Cross 
and Emerson Tiller found similar patterns.  Furthermore, the idea that judges would behave 
differently when surrounded by like-minded colleagues is well grounded in research from 
social psychology concerning group deliberations.  Groups of like-minded persons tend to 
push one another towards the extremes of their common beliefs, while the existence of 
diverse thinkers (or potential whistle-blowers) in a group tends to moderate the results of the 
group’s deliberations.   
                                                 
45 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note ___, at 24–57. 
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Again, more research is necessary to determine whether this apparent pattern is 
genuine—whether Democratic appointees actually vote differently in preemption cases when 
the panel is comprised exclusively of Democrats.  But if the effect is real, it would be 
interesting, for it would show that the ideological composition of a panel can influence 
judicial decision making even in an area of the law that is not particularly ideological.  
Stated differently, it would show that group dynamics can significantly amplify (or moderate) 
even small ideological differences between Republican and Democratic judges. 
 
3.  Differences across the Courts of Appeals 
 
Finally, as Table 7 illustrates, the data reveal some large differences in voting 
patterns across the different Courts of Appeals.  For instance, judges on the D.C. Circuit and 
the Eighth Circuit were quite friendly to claims of preemption, voting in favor of preemption 
at rates of 80 percent and 70 percent, respectively.  In contrast, judges on the Ninth Circuit 
(35 percent) and the Fifth Circuit (40 percent) were quite hostile to preemption, at least in 
relative terms.  Even more interestingly, Democrats on some Courts of Appeals voted in 
favor of preemption more frequently than most court-specific groups of Republicans, and 
Republicans on some Courts of Appeals voted against preemption more frequently than most 
court-level groups of Democrats.  Democrats on the Eighth Circuit, for example, voted in 
favor of preemption more frequently than Republicans on any court other than those on the 
D.C. and Federal Circuits, both of which handed down only a handful of preemption 
decisions.  Thus, among courts that decided at least ten preemption cases between 2005 and 
2009, the group of judges singularly most apt to vote in favor of preemption was Democrats 
on the Eighth Circuit.  Meanwhile, Republicans on the Ninth Circuit were less likely to vote 
in favor of preemption than Democrats on any court other than their colleagues on the Ninth 
Circuit and those on the Third Circuit.   
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Because the number of cases decided by any one circuit was rather small (between 8 
and 69), some of these disparities might well be no more than noise in the data.  Nonetheless, 
the results at least suggest an intriguing possibility: that the court on which a judge sits may 
be a critical variable in predicting her voting record in preemption decisions—and perhaps a 
more significant variable than the national political party with which she is affiliated.  For 
instance, that a judge sits on the Ninth Circuit may tell us more about how she is likely to 
decide a preemption case than that she was appointed by a Republican president.  A rigorous 
examination of this possibility is beyond the scope of this paper, but it seems a promising 
avenue for further research, both for preemption cases specifically and for the circuit courts’ 
decisions more generally. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Even if the core findings of this study only confirm what many already suspected, 
they still tell us something useful about American politics and their influences on judicial 
decision making.  First, although many issues seem to have become ideological battlegrounds 
in the circuit courts, federal preemption has not been one of them.  One could certainly 
imagine a different state of affairs.  Given the significance of preemption, both in terms of 
structural principles and practical consequences, it could have been source of substantial 
friction between Republicans and Democrats.  But it was not.  The accepted sources of legal 
authority, or perhaps the norms of consensus and collegiality on the Courts of Appeals, have 
largely controlled judicial behavior in this area.  This says something important about the 
issue of preemption, as well as the degree to which decision making by federal circuit courts 
can accurately be called “political.” 
Second, to the extent the issue of preemption does carry a partisan valence, that 
valence is one in which Republican judges tend to vote in favor of preemption and 
Democratic judges tend to vote against it.  This might be because, within the Republican 
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Party, those who care deeply about reducing economic regulation have been more successful 
than conservatives of other stripes in shaping their party’s judicial nominations.  Or it might 
be because those within the Democratic Party committed to preserving state-level regulation 
of private business activity, particularly through state tort liability, have been successful in 
shaping their party’s judicial nominations.  Or it might be a combination of the two.   
In all events, in the few preemption cases where at least one judge dissented, 
Republican circuit judges were much more apt to vote in favor of preemption than 
Democrats.  Knowing this provides some insight into the policy priorities of the two major 
parties as they relate to judicial nominations—and the extent to which those policy goals 
have actually influenced judicial decision making. 
